his generous remarks concerning the quality of the book. This response, then, to employ a metaphor suitable to the occasion and the company, is not meant to bite the hand that feeds me. Rather, I would like to reply to some of Dr. Feldmann's critical comments in the hope of expanding upon some points which were perhaps not made sufficiently clear in my text.
To begin with, I want to comment on the alleged contradiction Dr. Feldmann has noted regarding my view of scientists and ethics. According to Feldmann, I both deny that scientists concern themselves with ethical issues, only at best placating society to assure continued funding, and yet also affmn that scientists are now considering research animal issues morally. Contrary to Dr. Feldmann's comment, the two remarks are not incompatible. The situation, I believe, is this: Scientists are indeed still being trained in a philosophy of science which disavows the relevance of ethics to science, and many leading scientists still echo that philosophy. For example, in Mader's popular basic biology text, Biology. 1990 edition, she asserts unequivocally that "science, by its very nature is impartial.... Science does not make ethical or moral decisions. Ifwe wish to make valuejudgments, we must go to other fields of study." This is echoed in another popular text, Keeton and Gould's Biological Science (1986) wherein the authors affmn that"anotherlimitation of science is that it cannot make value judgments....
[S]cience cannot make moral judgments." And in February of 1989, NIH director James Wyngaarden was quoted as saying that "research should not be hampered by moral considerations" (MichiganState News, February 27, 1989) . Thus is scientific ideology alive and well.
If this is the sort of philosophy taught to nascent scientists, one can understand their failure to engage moral questions. This can be undone in only two ways: First, one can change how scientists are educated and show them that value questions are indeed part and parcel of science, something I have been doing for 15 years. This is very effective but not widely done. AltemativelY,onecanlegislateattention to moral issues, in the hope that, in adhering to the law, scientists will change their gestalt. This is indeed part of the thinking behind mandating local review of animal research projects -those of us who drafted recent federal legislation on laboratory animals felt that mandating discussion in such committees would help break ideological bonds. But even for those who do not end up thinking differently, respect for law forces concern with what the law requires, for example, control of animal pain and suffering.
Thus, one can see that the "contradiction" cited by Feldmann is nothing of the sort. Scientists are still to a large extent in the grip of the claim that science is valuefree, yet both educational and regulatory vectors have begun to undermine the hold of that ideology and have forced changes in behavior which lead scientists to conform with emerging public morality regarding animals. Inevitably, being forced to deliberate about research and the control of pain and suffering will lead some scientists to break their ideological bonds; others, on the other hand, will adhere to the letter of the law while finding its spirit incomprehensible or, at best, sentimental nonsense. Either way, things improve for animals, and implicit ethical judgments, hitherto ignored or disavowed, become more explicit.
Furthermore, as society in general becomes more concernedabout the issues raised by animal use, scientists must increasingly answer to queries from the general public regarding the moral justification for such uses. Again, articulation of such justification in public forwns such as news broadcasts, talk shows and magazines forces greater appreciation and greater sophistication regarding traditional ethicalassumptions. As I point out in I!K< UnheededQ:y, one recent textbook in psychology shows a photograph of a laboratory rat with a caption
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asserting that "for moral reasons, animals are used in psychological research" -as if the invasive use of animals does not raise a moral question! If the authors were compelled to defend that statement, they would probably be led to significantly amend it. One of the most serious criticisms raised by Feldmann and others regarding my book is the charge of "science bashing" -the notion that ifone is critical of some current practices in science, one is "anti-science." This is currently a popular strategy among those threatenedby criticism ofanimal research -dismissing the critics as anti-intellectual Luddites out to restore the Dark Ages, unappreciative of the advances made by modem science. I'm surprised that Dr. Feldmann allows himself to be drawn into this mode.
To be supportive ofsomething does not require that one ignore its defects. I am, for example, enamored of old Harley-Davidson motorcycles; nonetheless, I am aware that there are major problems associated with their engines. So, too, was the Harley-Davidson Company,andthey have essentially solved the problems. Many members of the scientific establishment are extremely concerned about the statistically small number ofcases ofdata falsification which Dr. Feldmann cavalierly dismisses. They are aware that such cases bespeak deep problems which are threatening to the very foundations and fabric of science. As many other people besides myself have pointed out, including Wade and Broadin their influential BetrayersQf~InI1b., such cases bespeak major "publish or perish" pressures associated with science as a career, rather than something pursued for its own sake or for social benefit If feeding one's family and paying the bills is predicated on publication, there will naturally be far more pressure to publish, and researchers will be more tempted to cut comers. It is for this reason that some scientists, such as MarshaAngellofthe~EnglandhmIllillQfMedicine. have suggested that publication be judged by quality not quantity.
In addition, as I point out in the book and Arthur Neufeld has also pointed out in a ~ Scientist article entitled"Howfar do you trustyourcolleagues?" (January 15,1987) , there is no money nor time for replication of research results. Often the relevant equipment is only available in the laboratory publishing the results, and as Neufeld says, "reproducibility is not one of the criteria used by referees when they accept an article for publication." Once again. then. we find another vector Between the Species which makes it simpler and more tempting to cut corners in research, namely littlechance ofbeing caught by the traditional internal reproducibility check.
All of this is further complicated by the fact that in many large laboratories, the actual "scut work" of running an experimentis left tojuniorscientists,graduate students, and technicians. The principal investigator's name goes on the final paper, yet he or she may have had little to do with the generation of the data. Many senior careers have been wrecked by failures at a lower level of which the investigator had no knowledge, yet for which he or she was held administratively responsible. Sloppiness at the most basic levels. let us recall, was instrumental in forcing the passage of the Good Laboratory Practices Act in the 1970's, something a prominentscientistfriend ofmine has called "the shame ofthe scientific community"because itlegally mandates what toxicological laboratories should have been doing anyway as presuppositional to their activities.
Numerous studies have indicated that most scientists know ofdata fudging orotherintentionalbias in reporting ofresearch results. In a survey conducted and published by ~~ Scientist in November of 1976, 92% of respondents indicated that they had direct or indirect experience of intentional bias; 66% of respondents indicated that they had experience of more than one case. I urge Dr. Feldmann to candidly query his own colleagues in research as I have done. I am certain he will find similar results. In addition, the New Scientist survey indicated that in 80% of the cases nothing happened to the data falsifiers -in only 10% of the cases was the end result dismissal. One question not asked by this survey was how many scientists would report cases of suspected data falsification -not surprisingly, other research has shown that the majority would not Our society has great ambivalence regarding "squealers"and"whistleblowers" -recall the message in Ibsen'sAnEnemyQf~~. Recall the childhood biasagainst"tattle-tales"and the perjorativeconnotation of "ratting" on someone.
I am not suggesting that all or most or many scientists are guilty of fraud. I am simply echoing a point made by Dan Greenburg in another article in the ~Scientist in November 1987 when he pointed out that there is little quality control in science and that "detection [of fraud] in most cases is ... accidental." Greenburg remarks that "for high octane gall in proclaiming its ethical purity, the scientific community has long been the runaway winner on the institutional landscape. Miscreants in our ranks are rare, it insists, but when the integrity ofscience is betrayed, defrocking of the culprits is assured by sensitive internal checks." Greenburg goes on to afftrm that this is not the case.
Finally, Dr. Feldmann should recall the context in which I raised the issue of fraud and bias in science. It was not to malign the research community, which is probably no more nor less honest than the rest of us, but rather to undercut the smug assurance which discredits anecdotal or observational accounts ofanimal behavior in contrast to controlled experiments. My point was to show that laboratory research is open to the same sort of extreme skepticism that time-tested anecdotal evidence ofanimal behavior is. The proper stance, in my view, is to examine both types ofevidence with a critical eye, as Romanes did, not to dismiss either as intrinsically inferior or flawed, and not assume that either is perfect* * Editors' Note: It is our policy to allow the reviewer a brief final word. Dr. Feldmann's reply is brief indeed: "Professor Rollin ably explicates his intentions. I am reassured. I respectfully refer readers to the book itself for context and tone."
(for the African elephant, and especially for the rnot'e than hair a million ~lIIed between 1980 and 1987) 
